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DRAFT   27 October 2012 
  
Codification, Progressive Development, or Scholarly Analysis? 
The Art of Packaging the ILC's Work Product 
 
forthcoming in THE RESPONSIBILITY OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS:  ESSAYS IN MEMORY OF 
SIR IAN BROWNLIE (Maurizio Ragazzi, ed.) (Martinus Nijhoff) (2013). 
 




 Due to his extraordinary accomplishments as a scholar, a practitioner, and a professor 
for legions of doctoral students, Ian Brownlie was a giant in the field of international law. 
Serving on the International Law Commission from 1997 to 2008, Brownlie was present 
during one of the most interesting periods of change in the way the ILC finalized its work, a 
period that in some respects climaxed with its draft articles on the responsibility of 
international   organizations.   As   a   tribute   to   Brownlie’s   contributions   to   the   field   of  
international  law,  this  essay  briefly  addresses  the  “art  of  packaging”  the  ILC’s  work  product,  
a   topic   which   has   considerable   implications   for   the   Commission’s   own   legacy   within   the  
field.  
 
 There  are  two  key  choices  that  must  be  made  by  the  Commission  when  “packaging”  
the outcome of a topic. First, the Commission must decide what it will call the product, 
having  a  menu  of  possibilities:  “draft  convention”;;  “draft  articles”;;  “principles”;;  “guidelines”;;  
“report”;;  and  so  on.  Second,  once  finalized,  the  Commission  must  decide  what  to  say  when  
sending the work product to the General Assembly, including whether to recommend that it 
be transformed into an international convention.  
 
 The   Commission’s   project   on   the   responsibility   of   international   organizations   was  
completed in the form of sixty-seven   “draft   articles,”   along with associated commentary. 
Those draft articles were sent to the General Assembly with a recommendation that the 
Assembly  “take  note  of  the  draft  articles  ...  in  a  resolution,  and  annex  them  to  the  resolution”  
and   “consider,   at   a   later   stage,   the   elaboration of a convention on the basis of the draft 
articles.1 While some of the rules set forth in the draft articles are non-controversial, others 
are much less settled, due to a dearth of practice and an uncertainty as to whether rules on 
responsibility that apply to States should apply mutatis mutandis to international 
organizations.  Consequently,  a  further  part  of  the  “packaging”  of  these  draft  articles  was  the  
inclusion   in   the   ILC’s   general   commentary  of   a   statement   that   the   “fact   that   several   of   the  
present draft articles are based on limited practice moves the border between codification and 
progressive development in the direction of the latter. ... In other words, the provisions of the 
present draft articles do not necessarily yet have the same authority as the corresponding 
provisions  on  State  responsibility.”2 
 
                                                          
1 Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Sixty-Third 
Session, Gen. Ass. Off. Recs., Sixty-sixth Session, Supp.  No. 10, at 53, para. 85 (A/66/10). 
2 Id. at 70. 
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Understanding the significance and reason for such a statement requires some 
understanding of the broader ways in which the Commission completes its work product, and 
how  such  “packaging”  has changed over time. 
  
II. Draft Conventions 
 
 As is well known, the Statute of the ILC originally envisaged two different types of 
projects  by  the  Commission:  “progressive  development”  projects  and  “codification”  projects.  
A project that progressively developed the law, by definition, created new rules, in that it 
addressed  “subjects  which  have  not   yet   been   regulated  by   international   law  or   in   regard   to  
which  the  law  has  not  yet  been  sufficiently  developed  in  the  practice  of  States.”  Progressive  
development could only be done by means of a convention3 and it was thought that the 
General Assembly would be the prime initiator of proposals in that regard,4 though proposals 
might also be advanced by other U.N. organs or specialized agencies, or by U.N. Member 
States.5 
 
 There have been just two projects expressly  concluded  by  the  ILC  as  “conventions,”  
both early in the life of the Commission. In 1954, the ILC adopted the Draft Convention on 
the Elimination of Future Statelessness,6 which was never developed into a treaty by States. 
The same year it adopted the Draft Convention on the Reduction of Future Statelessness,7 
which led to the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness.8 Both conventions were 
proposed  by   the  Economic  and  Social  Council,  which   in  1950  urged  “that   the   International  
Law Commission prepare at the earliest possible date the necessary draft international 
convention  or  conventions  for  the  elimination  of  statelessness.”9 
 
  Early  in  its  existence,  the  Commission  found  that  the  distinction  between  “progressive  
development”   and   “codification”   of   the   law  was   not   sustainable   in   practice;;   in  most   areas  
there were both settled rules and gaps requiring the development of new rules. Moreover, ILC 
Members would often differ as to whether a particular rule already existed or was being 
developed by the Commission. As such, the Commission stopped advancing any of its 
                                                          
3 See Statute of the International Law Commission, Art. 15 (ILC Statute)  (“In  the  following  
articles the expression progressive development of international law is used for convenience 
as meaning the preparation of draft conventions on subjects which have not yet been 
regulated by international law or in regard to which the law has not yet been sufficiently 
developed  in  the  practice  of  States.”). 
4 Id., Art. 16. 
5 Id., Art. 17(1). 
6 See Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Sixth Session, Gen. 
Ass. Off. Recs., Ninth Session, Supp. No. 10, at para. 25 (A/9/10).  
7 Id. 
8 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, 989 U.N.T.S .175. 




projects  as  draft  “conventions,”  since   that   term  might  have  conveyed  a  view  that   the  entire  
project was one of progressive development. 
 
 Even so, one recent project might be thought to fall  into  this  category:    the  ILC’s  1994  
“Draft   Statute”   for   an   International  Criminal  Court,  with   commentaries,10 which led to the 
1998   treaty   entitled   “Rome  Statute  of   the   International  Criminal  Court.”11 The project was 
proposed by the U.N. General Assembly,  which   in   1992   requested   “the   International   Law  
Commission to continue its work on [the] question [of international criminal jurisdiction] by 
undertaking the project for the elaboration of a draft statute for an international criminal court 
as a matter  of  priority  as  from  its  next  session,  ...  with  a  view  to  drafting  a  statute  ....”  12 The 
term  “statute,”  however,  was  not  synonymous  with  “convention,”   for  at   the  time  it  was  not  
clear what form the new court would take. While the court might have been established by a 
multilateral treaty, the Commission also contemplated the possibility of the court being 
created either as a new organ of the United Nations (through amendment of the Charter) or as 
a subsidiary organ of the Security Council (such as had occurred with the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia).13 As   such,   the   term   “statute”  was   a   neutral  
expression adaptable to whatever means might ultimately be used for establishing the court.
   
 
III. Draft Articles 
 
 As noted above, the  ILC  Statute  also  envisaged  “codification”  projects,  by  which  was  
meant   “the   more   precise   formulation   and   systematization   of   rules   of   international   law   in  
fields  where  there  already  has  been  extensive  State  practice,  precedent  and  doctrine.”14 In the 
period prior to adoption of the ILC Statute, many government representatives thought that a 
codification project should not be concluded as an international convention. As the U.N. 
Secretariat  noted  during  the  drafting  of  the  ILC  Statute,  “the  failure  of  governments to reach 
agreement, for political reasons, in a conference convened to codify rules of international 
law, would seem to cast doubt upon certain rules of international law whose validity had been 
admitted for a very long time and which had hitherto generally been assumed to be part of 
customary  international  law.”15 
 
 For a majority of the drafters of the ILC Statute (led by the U.K. delegate, James 
Brierly),   codification   projects   were   largely   a   “scientific”   task,   in   which   knowledgeable  
                                                          
10 See Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Forty-Sixth Session, 
Gen. Ass. Off. Recs., Forty-Ninth Session, Supp. No. 10, at 26 (A/49/10).  
11 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 3. 
12 G.A. Res. 47/33, para. 6 (Nov. 25, 1992). 
13 See Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Forty-Sixth Session, 
Gen. Ass. Off. Recs., Forty-ninth Session, Supp. No. 10, at 73-74 (A/49/10).  
14 ILC Statute, Art. 15. 
15 Memorandum on Methods for Encouraging the Progressive Development of International 
Law and Its Eventual Codification, U.N. Doc. A/AC.10/7, at 7 (May 6, 1947); see generally 
R. Dhokalia, The Codification of Public International Law (Manchester, 1971), 203-16. 
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“jurists”   can   carefully identify and declare the rules that already exist. The persuasive 
authority  of  such  “restatements”  would  turn  on  their  intrinsic  merits,  though  over  time  States  
might decide to endorse the product officially through a General Assembly resolution or by 
turning it into an international convention. A minority group (led by the Soviet 
delegate,Vladimir Koretsky), thought that all Commission projects should culminate in an 
international convention.16 Yet even at that time, it was recognized that a codification project 
would involve some element of development of the law, and that the distinction being drawn 
was really one of degree.17 Consequently, there needed to be some degree of flexibility in the 
final outcome of a codification project; having the Commission  simply  issue  a  “restatement”  
might not in all instances be appropriate. With that in mind, the ILC Statute provides that for 
codification  projects   the  Commission   should  prepare   “its   drafts   in   the   form  of   articles”   for  
submission to the General Assembly   with   a   commentary.”18 After receiving the views of 
States,   the  Commission  should   then  “prepare  a   final  draft  and  explanatory   report,”19 with a 
recommendation to the General Assembly that it: (a) take no action; (b) take note of or adopt 
the report by resolution; (c) recommend the draft to Members with a view to the conclusion 
of a convention; or (d) convoke a conference to conclude a convention.20 
 
 This   type   of   project,   typically   referred   to   as   “draft   articles,”   has   emerged   as   the  
dominant vehicle for   the  Commission’s  work,  whether   the   project   is   thought   to   be   one   of  
codification, of progressive development, or a combination of the two. As indicated above, 
once the draft articles are completed, the Commission may send them forward with a 
recommendation that the General Assembly convene a diplomatic conference, whereby 
States consider, refine, and adopt the articles as a convention. That approach was often taken 
in   the  first  few  decades  of   the  Commission’s  existence,  as   is  reflected  in   the  Commission’s 
projects that lead to the 1958 law of the sea conventions, the 1961 and 1963 conventions on 
diplomatic and consular relations, the 1969 convention on the law of treaties, and the 1975 
convention on the representation of States in their relations with international organizations, 
to name but a few. 
 
 More recently, the Commission has refrained from recommending the convening of a 
diplomatic conference, no doubt in part because the General Assembly has become less 
enthusiastic about launching an expensive multilateral treaty negotiation. Instead, the 
Commission is more likely simply to recommend pursuit of the project as a convention, 
recognizing   that   the  General  Assembly  may  wish   to   refine   the  Commission’s   draft   articles  
through work undertaken within its own Sixth Committee. An example would be the 
Commission’s  Draft  Articles  on  Jurisdictional  Immunities  of  States  and  Their  Property  with  
commentaries,21 which were submitted to the General Assembly in 1991. Rather than 
                                                          
16 H. Briggs, The International Law Commission (Cornell U. Press, 1965),129-41. 
17 Id. at 135, 137-38. 
18 ILC Statute, Art. 20. 
19 Id., Art. 22. 
20 Id., Art. 23(1). 
21 See Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Forty-third Session, 
Gen. Ass. Off. Recs., Forty-sixth Session, Supp. No. 10, at para. 28 (A/46/10).  
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convene a diplomatic conference, the General Assembly decided to establish an ad hoc 
committee  of  the  Sixth  Committee  to  refine  the  Commission’s  work,22 ultimately leading to 
the adoption by the Assembly in 2004 of the U.N. Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities 
of States and Their Property.23 
 
  The General Assembly, of course, can decline to develop the project as a convention, 
even in the face of a Commission recommendation that it do so. For example, in 1989 the 
Commission recommended that the General Assembly convene a diplomatic conference to 
transform   into  a  convention   the  Commission’s  draft  articles  on   the  status  of   the  diplomatic  
courier and the diplomatic bag not accompanied by diplomatic courier.24 Although the 
General Assembly had originally asked the Commission to pursue a protocol to the Vienna 
Convention on Diplomatic Relations on this topic,25 in 1995 the General Assembly decided 
simply to bring the draft articles to the attention of States and to remind them of the 
possibility of codification at some future time.26 No further work has been undertaken on the 
matter. 
 
 When the General Assembly decides not to pursue a convention despite a 
recommendation of the Commission to that effect, there may be an implication that the 
Commission’s  work  was  not  acceptable   to  States,  which   in   turn may imply that the project 
failed to capture properly the law concerning that topic. In part to avoid any such 
implications, the Commission recently has sent forward its draft articles without any 
recommendation that they be transformed into convention, most famously with respect to the 
2001 Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts.27 For that 
project,   the  Commission   recommended   only   that   the  General  Assembly   “take   note”   of   the  
draft  articles,  with  the  possibility  “at  a  later  stage”  of  transforming  them  into  a  convention.28 
The   General   Assembly   then   took   note   of   the   draft   articles   and   commended   “them   to   the  
attention of Governments without prejudice to the question of their future adoption or other 
appropriate  action.”29 
 
 The  Commission’s  decision   to  send   the  draft  articles  on  state   responsibility   forward  
with  such  a  recommendation  was  understandable.  As  Frank  Berman  has  noted,  “[t]his  was  an  
area where there could be quite legitimate doubts whether the international treaty process, in 
                                                          
22 G.A. Res. 55/150 (Dec. 12, 2000). 
23 G.A. Res. 59/38 (Dec. 2, 2004). 
24 See Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Forty-First Session, 
Gen. Ass. Off. Recs., Forty-fourth Session, Supp. No. 10, at 13 (A/44/10). 
25 G.A. Res. 31/76, para. 4 (Dec. 13, 1976). 
26 G.A. Dec. 50/416 (Dec. 11, 1995). 
27 Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Fifty-third 
Session, Gen. Ass. Off. Recs., Fifty-sixth Session, Supp.  No. 10, at 26, para. 76 (A/56/10). 
28 Id. at 25, paras. 72-73. 
29 G.A. Res. 56/83, para. 3 (Dec. 12, 2001); see also G.A. Res. 59/35 (Dec. 2, 2004). 
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its current state, was up to a law-making exercise of so major and fundamental a scope, and 
doubts at the same time whether a treaty negotiation would or would not solidify agreement 
on  the  essential  rules.”30 Moreover, given that the Commission had been criticized over the 
years for being too rigid in assuming that the end product should be a convention,31 and given 
that some of its conventions failed to secure many adherents,32 it is unsurprising that the 
Commission would consider a different path. 
 
 Yet   the  Commission’s   decision  was   also   controversial,   both  within   and   outside   the  
Commission.   According   to   David   Caron,   “the   particular   question   of   form   was   intensely  
argued   and   narrowly   decided”   in   the   Commission,   with   many   members   supporting   a 
recommendation that would call for the development of a convention.33 Caron and others 
have  expressed  concern  that  the  Commission’s  approach  may  have  pushed  “the  limits  of  its  
legitimacy  to  state  what  the  law  is,”  since  several  of  the  draft  articles  involved a contestable 
development of the law, rather than just codification.34 An approach whereby the 
Commission blends codification with progressive development is defensible if the ultimate 
outcome is the adoption by States of a convention, but such blending in a situation where no 
further State action is envisaged, and with the expectation that the draft articles will simply be 
seen  as  “the  law,”  potentially  casts  the  Commission  in  the  role  of  legislator. 
 
 Avoidance of that problem helps explain the statement   in   the   ILC’s   general  
commentary to the draft articles on responsibility of international organizations, quoted in the 
Introduction  of   this  essay.  The  Commission  characterized  the  project  as  “draft  articles”  and  
made the same recommendation as it had in 2001 with respect to the draft articles on state 
responsibility, to the effect that the General Assembly simply take note of the draft articles 
and  perhaps  “at  a  later  stage”  consider  their  elaboration  as  a  convention.35 By doing so, the 
Commission was offering up the draft articles in a manner that might be perceived as pure 
codification. Yet the paucity of practice of international organizations on myriad rules 
contained in the articles, and the uncertainty as to whether State practice could support 
mutatis mutandis rules relating to international organizations, opened the door to serious 
accusations that the Commission was overstepping its bounds. By signaling in its 
commentary  that  the  border  between  codification  and  progressive  development  was  more  “in 
the  direction  of  the  latter”  for  several  of  the  articles,  and  that  consequently  such  articles  “do  
                                                          
30 See F.  Berman,  ‘The  ILC  within  the  UN’s  Legal  Framework:  Its  Relationship  with  the  
Sixth Committee’,  49  GYIL (2006), 107, at 124. 
31 See, e.g., B. Ramcharan, The International Law Commission (Martinus Nijhoff, 1977), 76; 
M. El Baradei, T. Franck, & R. Trachtenberg, The International Law Commission: the Need 
for a New Direction (UNITAR, 1981), 27. 
32 For a discussion, see I. Sinclair, The International Law Commission (Cambridge, 1987), 
39.  
33 D.  Caron,  ‘The  ILC  Articles  on  State  Responsibility:  The  Paradoxical  Relationship  
between  Form  and  Authority’,  96  AJIL (2002), 857 at 863-64. 
34 Id. at 858. 
35 Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Sixty-Third 
Session, Gen. Ass. Off. Recs., Sixty-sixth Session, Supp.  No. 10, at 53, para. 85 (A/66/10). 
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not necessarily yet have the same authority as the corresponding provisions on State 
responsibility,”  the  Commission  sought  to  neutralize  its  critics.   
 
 As such, the historical arc of the packaging of Commission projects might be seen as 
coming full circle. Originally, projects would  be  clearly  distinguished  as  “draft  conventions”  
when they contained significant amounts of progressive development of the law,  but that 
approach was abandoned due to a belief that all projects involve a blend of progressive 
development  and  codification.  Instead,  projects  were  labeled  as  “draft  articles”  but,  given  the    
blend of progressive development/codification rules, the Commission sent the project 
forward with a recommendation that they be transformed into a convention, thereby 
preserving   the   legitimacy   of   the   Commission’s   work.   Once   the   Commission   ceased  
recommending that its projects be transformed into a convention, serious questions of 
legitimacy  arose,  for  the  Commission  arguably  was  advancing  its  work  as  pure  “codification”  
when in fact it was not.  Claims of illegitimacy were so apparent with respect to the draft 
articles on responsibility of international organizations, that the Commission reacted by 
finding a way to re-package the project as containing significant elements of progressive 
development,  much  as  the  characterization  of  its  projects  as  “draft  conventions”  was  meant  to  
do decades before. 
 
 Even so, the Commission appears likely to include language in its commentary 
characterizing   draft   articles   as   “progressive   development”   only   when   the   articles   are   so  
perceived within and (perhaps more importantly) outside the Commission. If there is no 
particular clamor that the Commission is progressively developing the law on a particular 
topic, then the approach to packaging taken in 2001 may well be repeated, as occurred with 
the  Commission’s  2011  draft    articles  on  the  effects  of  armed  conflicts  on  treaties.36 
 
 While  “draft  articles”  have  been  the  dominant  way  of  packaging  the  work  products  of  
the   Commission,   arguably   there   “are   no   formal   limits   to   the   form   of   the   Commission’s  
output.”37 Indeed, over the years there have been several other forms used (discussed below), 
which in the future may be of considerable use to the Commission as it straddles its role in 
codifying and progressively developing the law. 
 
IV. Draft Codes 
  
 On   two   occasions,   the   Commission   has   produced   what   it   characterized   as   “draft  
codes.”   In   1947,   as one of its first assignments to the Commission, the General Assembly 
asked   the  Commission   to   “[f]ormulate   the  principles  of   international   law   recognized   in   the  
Charter  of  the  Nürnberg  Tribunal  and  in  the  judgment  of  the  Tribunal”  and  “[p]repare  a  draft  
Code   of   Offences   against   the   Peace   and   Security   of   Mankind”.38 The discussions at the 
General Assembly and then within the Commission indicate that this was not intended to be a 
draft treaty but, instead, an exercise that would assist in the development of an international 
criminal court. In 1954, the Commission adopted the Draft Code of Offences against the 
                                                          
36 Id., at 174, para. 97. 
37 M.  Wood,  “The  General  Assembly  and  the  International  Law  Commission:  “What  
Happens  to  the  Commission’s  Work  and  Why?”,  in International Law Between Universalism 
and Fragmentation (Isabelle Buffard et al., eds., Martinus Nijhoff, 2008), 373 at 375. 
38 G.A. Res. 177(II) (Nov. 21, 1947). 
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Peace and Security of Mankind,39 consisting of four articles with commentaries. In sending 
the  draft   code   to   the  General  Assembly,   the  Commission   stated   that   it   “has  not   considered  
itself   called   upon   to   propose  methods   by  which   a   code  may   be   given   binding   force”,   but  
instead  “has  envisaged the possibility of an international tribunal for the trial and punishment 
of  persons  committing  such  offences.”40 
 
 In 1981, the General Assembly asked the Commission to resume work of further 
elaboration of the code.41 In conjunction with the development of the Draft Statute for an 
International Criminal Court in 1996 (noted above), the Commission produced a more 
detailed Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind, again with 
commentaries.42 In sending it to the General Assembly, the Commission noted that it could 
be transformed into an international convention, could be incorporated as part of the statute 
of an international criminal court, or could be adopted by a declaration of the General 
Assembly.43 Ultimately, the code helped guide the diplomatic conference that led to adoption 
of the Rome Statute. 
 
V. Model Rules 
 
 On  one  occasion,   the  Commission   characterized   its  work  product   as   “model   rules,”  
which were finalized in 1958 in the Model Rules on Arbitral Procedure, with commentary. 
Initially,  however,  the  Commission  developed  “draft  articles”  on  arbitral  procedure,  which  it  
recommended that the General Assembly transform into a convention. After receiving 
comments form governments, however, the Assembly invited the Commission to reconsider 
its   approach,   which   led   the   special   rapporteur   to   convert   the   draft   articles   into   “model  
rules.”44 The   Commission   then   recommended   that   the   Assembly   adopt   the   Commission’s  
report by a resolution, but the Assembly chose   instead   to   just   “take   note”   of   the   report,  
bringing it to the attention of States for their consideration as appropriate.45 
 
VI. Draft Principles 
 
 On three occasions, the Commission has characterized its work product as 
“principles,”  which  appear  intended to influence the development of international or national 
law, but not to codify it into specific rules. In 1950, it completed seven Principles of 
International Law Recognized in the Charter of the Nürnberg Tribunal and in the Judgment of 
                                                          
39 Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Sixth 
Session, Gen. Ass. Off. Recs., Ninth Session, Supp.  No. 9, at 151, para. 54 (A/2693). 
40 Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1954, Vol. II, at 134, para. 52(d). 
41 G.A. Res. 36/106 (Dec. 10, 1981). 
42 Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Forty-eighth 
Session, Gen. Ass. Off. Recs., Fifty-first Session, Supp.  No. 10, at 17, para. 50 (A/51/10). 
43  Id., at 17, at paras. 47-48. 
44 I. Sinclair, The International Law Commission (Cambridge, 1987), 37.  
45 G.A. Res. 1262(XIII), para. 2 (Nov. 14, 1958). 
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the Tribunal, with commentaries,46 designed to influence future development of a draft code 
and creation of an international criminal court. In 2006, it adopted the Draft Principles on the 
Allocation of Loss in the Case of Transboundary Harm Arising Out of Hazardous 
Activities,47 with commentaries, an effort to promote (but not compel) harmonization of 
national laws through recommendations rather than hard law.48 Also in 2006, the 
Commission transformed what had originally been envisaged as draft articles into the 
Guiding Principles Applicable to Unilateral Declarations of States Capable of Creating Legal 
Obligations, with commentaries.49 Characterization   of   the   project   as   “guiding   principles”  
(and its limitation to just one form of unilateral act – declarations of States) was driven by the 
recognition that there many different ways in which unilateral acts may have legal effects in 
international law, making it difficult to establish a set of general rules applicable to all of 
them.  Both  sets  of  “principles”  adopted  in 2006 were simply commended to the attention of 
the General Assembly. 
 
VII. Guide to Practice 
 
 On   one   occasion   the   Commission   completed   its   work   in   the   form   of   a   “guide   to  
practice,”  which  occurred  in  2011  with  the  Guide  to  Practice  on  Reservations  to  Treaties. The 
Guide to Practice consisted of an introduction, an extensive series of guidelines, commentary, 
an  annex  addressing  the  “dialogue”  that  should  occur  when  a  State  files  a  reservation,  and  a  
bibliography. The reason the project was presented in this way, according to the Commission, 
was   “to   provide   assistance   to   practitioners   of   international   law,   who   are   often   faced   with  
sensitive problems concerning, in particular the validity and effects of reservations to treaties 
... and, to a lesser extent, interpretive  declarations  in  respect  of  treaty  provisions  ...  .”50  
 
 The Guide itself was expressly declared not to be binding,51 but instead to be a 
“‘toolbox’  in  which  the  negotiators  of  treaties  and  those  responsible  for  implementing  them  
should find answers  to  the  practical  questions  raised  by  reservations  ...  .”52  Indeed, many of 
its  provisions  are  in  the  nature  of  recommendations  that  “would  not  have  been  included  in  a  
traditional set of draft articles intended to be transformed, if appropriate, into a  treaty  ...”.53 
                                                          
46  Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Second 
Session, Gen. Ass. Off. Recs., Fifth Session, Supp.  No. 12, at 17, para. 97 (A/1316). 
47 Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Fifty-eighth 
Session, Gen. Ass. Off. Recs., Sixty-first Session, Supp.  No. 10, at 106, para. 85 (A/61/10). 
48 See Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Fifty-Sixth Session, 
Gen. Ass. Off. Recs., Fifty-ninth Session, Supp. No. 10, at 160 (A/59/10). 
49  Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Fifty-eighth 
Session, Gen. Ass. Off. Recs., Sixty-first Session, Supp.  No. 10, at 369, para. 177 (A/61/10). 
50 Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Sixty-Third 
Session, Gen. Ass. Off. Recs., Sixty-sixth Session, Supp.  No. 10, at 34, para. 85 (A/66/10). 
51 Id. 





VIII. Draft Declaration 
 
 In 1947, the General Assembly asked the Commission to prepare a draft declaration 
on the broad rights and duties of States54 (e.g., setting forth the rule that every State has the 
right to equality under the law with every other State), which the Commission completed in 
1949 with commentaries.55 When submitting the draft declaration to the Assembly, the 
Commission said it was for the Assembly to decide on any further course of action. The 
Assembly ultimately decided that, due to the limited response by States to the draft 





 The Commission is capable of adopting its own resolutions which, inter alia, may 
make recommendations to State. In 1994, the Commission adopted and transmitted to the 
General Assembly a Resolution on Confined Transboundary Groundwater,57 as a part of its 
report on the law of the non-navigational uses of international watercourses. In that 
resolution,   the  Commission  commended  “States   to  be  guided  by  the  principles  contained  in  
the draft articles on the law of the non-navigational uses of international watercourses, where 




 The  Commission,  of  course,   submits  annual  “reports”   to   the  General  Assembly,  but  
on  rare  occasion  it  has  also  issued  a  “report”  as  a  means  of  concluding  its  work  on  a  topic,  
which is typically a discussion of certain aspects of the law in a particular area. In 1950, the 
Commission submitted to the General Assembly a Report on the Ways and Means for 
Making the Evidence of Customary International Law More Readily Available.59 In 1951, the 
Commission submitted a Report on Reservations to Multilateral Conventions.60 In 1963, it 
submitted a Report on Extended Participation in General Multilateral Treaties Concluded 
                                                          
54 G.A. Res. 178(II) (Nov. 21, 1947). 
55 Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its First 
Session, Gen. Ass. Off. Recs., Fourth Session, Supp.  No. 10, para. 46 (A/CN.4/13 and Corr. 
1-3). 
56 G.A. Res. 596 (VI) (Dec. 7, 1951). 
57 See Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Forty-Sixth Session, 
Gen. Ass. Off. Recs., Forty-Ninth Session, Supp. No. 10, at 135 (A/49/10).  
58 Id., para. 1. 
59 Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Second 
Session, Gen. Ass. Off. Recs., Fifth Session, Supp. No. 12, paras. 24-94 (A/1316). 
60 Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Third 
Session, Gen. Ass. Off. Recs., Sixth Session, Supp. No. 9, paras. 12-34 (A/1858). 
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under the Auspices of the League of Nations.61  
 
 The report need not be a report of the Commission as a whole. In 1977, the General 
Assembly   invited   the   Commission   to   provide   “observations”   to   the   Secretary-General to 
assist in preparation of his report on techniques and procedures in the multilateral treaty 
process.62 In 1979, the Commission submitted to the Secretary-General the Report of a 
Working Group on Review of the Multilateral Treaty-Making Process,63 which focused on 
the  Commission’s  role  in  that  process.  Although  the  report  was  of  the  working  group,  it  was  
approved by the Commission.64 In 2006, the Commission took note of the  “conclusions”  of  
its Study Group on the Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties arising from the 
Diversification and Expansion of International Law65 and commended them to the attention 
of the General Assembly. Further, the Commission requested that the analytical study 
finalized by the Chairman of the Study Group (Martti Koskenniemmi) be made available on 




 Over its life, the Commission has developed various ways of packaging its work 
product. Multiple techniques are available – the format of the project, the characterization of 
the project in the commentary, and the recommendation for what is to be done with it – for 
balancing  the  Commission’s  roles  in  advancing the codification and progressive development 
of international law. While creative use of such techniques to suit the particular topics on the 
Commission’s  agenda  is  to  be  welcomed,  the  Commission’s  authority  and  legacy  ultimately  
will turn on whether States and other relevant actors view the Commission as adhering to its 







                                                          
61 Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Fifteenth 
Session, Gen. Ass. Off. Recs., Eighteenth Session, Supp., paras. 18-50 (A/5509). 
62 G.A. Res. 32/48 (Dec. 8, 1977). 
63 U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/325 (1979). 
64 Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Thirty-first 
Session, Gen. Ass. Off. Recs., Thirty-Fourth Session, Supp. No. 10, para. 191 (A/34/10). 
65 Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Fifty-eighth 
Session, Gen. Ass. Off. Recs., Sixty-first Session, Supp. No. 10, para. 251 (A/61/10). 
66 Id., para. 239. 
